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For governments within many modern welfare states it has become a key challenge to guarantee the 
quality and accessibility of social service provision to citizens. Under the third-party government in 
Belgium, this implied that far from producing the lion’s share of these services themselves, 
governments increasingly involved private nonprofit organizations (NPOs) to implement those 
policies (Salamon, Anheier et.aL., 1999). These NPOs have become appealing partners due to their 
bottom-up nature, a position close to clients and their rather small scale of operation. Hence, it is 
expected that NPOs have greater opportunities for tailoring services to citizens’ needs and are better 
able to perform a radar function by signaling new or rather ‘unconventional’ needs as well 
(Salamon, 1995; Boris and Steuerle, 1999). As a result, the focus of government shifted from 
‘rowing’ to ‘steering’ (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). This implies a separation between the process 
of planning social policies from the actual implementation of those policies by NPOs (OECD, 
2012). In essence, we argue that governments hereby develop a set of strategic management 
practices in order to steer and control the NPOs that carry out policies, while equally granting them 
a meaningful voice in the development of new policies as well.  
This contribution analyzes the nature and consequences of the strategic management practices that 
have been developed in the particular context of the third-party government regime in Flanders, the 
Dutch speaking region of Belgium. As legislative powers increasingly shifted to the level of the 
three so-called ‘regions’ in Belgium, the Flemish government obtained a central role in developing 
and implementing its own social policies. It opted to gradually incorporate the private nonprofit 
sector, which has raised significant size in Flanders due to historical processes of pillarization. As a 
result, many NPOs nowadays receive more than half of their total budget from public funding by 
Flemish government (Verschuere and De Corte, 2013). We hereby address two particular questions. 
The first one is about unraveling the nature of the strategic management practices, as performed by 
Flemish government, with respect to the publically funded NPOs that are involved through different 
stages of the policy cycle. We argue that strategic management has two dimensions: ensuring 
involvement of key civil society stakeholders (such as NPOs), both through formal and informal 
channels of information exchange, for developing fair and equitable policies on the one hand, and 
the process of controlling and steering the actors that actually implement those policies by imposing 
accountability requirements on the other (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992; OECD, 2012). 
The second question is then about the actual impact of these strategic management practices on the 
Flemish NPOs. Starting from the relatively ‘close’ relationship with Flemish government (e.g. 
financially, in terms of accountability pressure, etc.) we could expect a negative impact to occur on 
the NPOs’ willingness to raise a critical voice when (in)formally participating to the development of 
new policies. Next, we might also expect the NPOs to be hampered by governmental interference in 
making their own organizational decisions, such as defining the target groups to be reached, the 
procedures through which these clients will be served, the results that have to be obtained, etc. We 
argue these questions to be highly relevant as it has been extensively stated that NPOs should not 
just become another arm of government (Huxham, 1995; Boyle and Butler, 2003). Instead, NPOs 
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need to maintain some degree of audacity and flexibility to produce tailor-made services for the 
range of citizens’ needs and demands they are confronted with on a daily basis. After all, it are 
especially these typical grassroots qualities that make them appealing partners for 
government(Boris and Steuerle, 1999).  
As outlined before, the above questions are studied against the background of the development of 
the third-party government regime as it was developed in Flanders in the aftermath of the second 
world war. The data that are presented in this contribution are derived from a recent large-N sample 
of more than 250 Flemish NPOs. Before we turn to our main research questions, the following 
chapter focuses on the background of this research project and the composition of the sample.  
About the sample of Flemish NPOs under study 
In order to address the questions about the nature and consequences of strategic management 
practices in Flanders, we basically rely on a large-N sample of more than 250 nonprofit 
organizations. In essence, the directors or managers of these NPOs were questioned about different 
dimensions of their relationships with government (e.g. funding streams, accountability pressure, 
participation to different stages of the policy cycle, the advocacy strategies to exert influence, etc.) 
and their perceptions about their autonomy with regard to the internal management of their 
respective organizations. The sample consists of NPOs that are active in four policy domains: the 
field of poverty reduction, elderly care, youth care and the integration of ethnic-cultural minorities. 
We argue that this is a representative share of organizations to obtain a full picture of the nonprofit 
sector in the domain of Flemish welfare provision. The main task of these publically funded NPOs 
is to deliver social services to citizens. Furthermore, the NPOs in our sample are private ones 
(meaning that they do not belong to the state apparatus), they have a nonprofit character (reflected 
in a mission without for-profit motives) and it are all ‘professionalized’ ones (meaning that no pure 
voluntary organizations were selected).  
Strategic management practices 
For Osborne and Gaebler (1992) strategic planning is a key concept for governments to reinvent 
themselves by separating the strategic planning and policy making function from the policy 
execution and the delivery of services. In this chapter we argue that strategic management entails 
two different dimensions: ensuring involvement of key civil society stakeholders for developing fair 
and equitable policies on the one hand, and steering, controlling and evaluating the actors that 
actually implement those policies on the other.  
First, in order to be responsive to citizens’ needs in an increasingly complex society, governments 
must connect with an expanding range of civil society stakeholders. Strategic management is then 
about creating the mechanisms for informed policy making by bringing together views of these 
important stakeholders (OECD, 2012). This is especially relevant with regard to the private NPOs 
that receive public funding to provide social services to citizens. The main argument is that these 
NPOs are an appealing partner for government, due to their bottom-up nature, expertise and unique 
position close to clients, to supply substantial evidence for making these informed policy choices 
(Salamon, 1995; Boris and Steuerle, 1999; Ross and Osborne, 1999). Still, while some Flemish 
NPOs succeeded in obtaining a formal role within the policy cycle, others primarily rely on some 
indirect strategies to steer government’s policy.  
In a recent study Flemish NPO managers were asked to indicate whether their organizations were 
involved in different stages of the policy cycle and about other strategies they rely on to exert 
influence. Table 15.1 shows that approximately two out of three of all nonprofit organizations has 
been formally involved by Flemish government in the process of developing (66,5%) new policies 
and evaluating (64,7%) them over time. Furthermore, NPOs seemed to rely on a wide range of 
additional strategies to protect the well-being of their clients and to promote economic development 
and social justice (Reid 1999; Bar and Schmid 2013). In concrete, almost half of the NPOs in our 
sample are able to maintain substantial informal contacts with policy makers (e.g. politicians and 
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administrations) next to these formal participation procedures. This implies that some NPOs benefit 
from additional channels of information exchange and one-on-one relationships with policy makers 
in order to defend their organizational interests. Besides, almost eight out of ten of the Flemish 
NPOs equally rely on more collective oriented strategies to exert their influence. This could be 
attributed to the functioning of various sectoral umbrella organizations in Flanders in which NPOs 
voluntarily chose to collaborate for adjusting their point of views and to translate these ideas into 
political claims. As Flemish government has gradually recognized these umbrella organizations as 
legitimate mouthpieces, NPOs are once more enabled to give input for enriching the policy making 
process (Verschuere and De Corte, 2013). As a result, we are able to argue that Flemish government 
relies on a range of formal and informal channels of information exchange to give NPOs a voice in 
the process of setting its strategic goals and developing new policies.  
Secondly, Osborne and Gaebler (1992) argue that steering is not only about setting the goals, but 
also about choosing the strategies to achieve them and involving the right organizations to carry 
them out. Hence, strategic management is not just a matter of making plans, but also to evaluate the 
actors involved in implementing government’s policies and the strategies on which they rely to do 
so.  
Although Flemish government does provide some social services itself, it heavily relies on the 
private nonprofit sector to carry out welfare provision to citizens (Salamon, Anheier et.al., 1999). 
As argued before, NPOs receive substantial public funding to perform these tasks. Still, these funds 
are not free of obligation as they are accompanied by a set of accountability requirements through 
which governments exerts some control over these non-public actors (Ospina, Diaz, et.al., 2002; 
Whitaker, Altman-Sauer et.al. 2004; May 2007; Benjamin 2008). In a narrow view, accountability 
could then be defined as the answerability to a higher authority in a bureaucratic chain  of command 
(Kearns, 1996). This reveals three fundamental questions: who is accountable (NPOs), to whom 
(Flemish government) and for what (Christensen and Ebrahim, 2006). Concerning this latter 
question, Cho and Gillespie (2006) argue that government’s main goal is to ensure the provision of 
services to citizens by imposing standards on quality. Furthermore, such reporting requirements 
could also be of administrative or financial nature or deal with measures of equality and the fair 
treatment of people  (Vincent and Harrow, 2005).  
Table 15.1 shows of the use of the accountability requirements as perceived by NPO managers.. 
These parameters are related to administrative and financial reporting, the quality of the services, 
the number of services to be produced (quantity), the target audience to be served and the social 
effects (e.g. reducing poverty, etc.) to be obtained. In general, each of the selected accountability 
parameters is relevant for more than 70% of all NPOs. Furthermore, approximately three out of four 
NPOs in our sample indicates of being held accountable on at least five of these parameters. This 
implies that the accountability pressure that is exerted by Flemish government could be considered 
as rather high. This finding is also reflected in the fact that eight out of ten organizations must 
report at least once a year (and sometimes even several times a year) to Flemish government on 
these accountability requirements. To conclude, we argue that in the course of this process, Flemish 
government is able to exert some degree of ‘control’ over the NPOs by maintaining oversight over 
and inducing prescriptions about for example the population of clients to be treated and the way 
how this clientele should be served.   
The impact of strategic management practices 
Throughout the historical development of the welfare state in Flanders, many NPOs have been 
considered by government as preferred and legitimate partners to plan, develop and implement 
social policies. As NPOs received large amounts of public funding to perform these roles, they 
gained financial stability, which allowed them to further broaden the scope of their activities to 
citizens (Froelich, 1999; Salamon, Anheier et.al., 1999). The strategic management practices of the 
Flemish government included involving, steering and evaluating the NPOs they fund. Still, there 
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might be the danger that maintaining such ‘close’ relationships with government has a negative 
impact on the NPOs’ structure, culture and behavior as well (Smith and Lipsky 1993). In general 
terms, Salamon (1995) points to ‘vendorism’, or the fact that the NPOs’ initial socially inspired 
mission could be distorted in the pursuit of governmental support. In essence, this is related to the 
potential loss of the NPOs’ distinctive competencies, which mainly result from their bottom-up 
nature and rather small scale of operation, and that give them the flexibility to respond to new or 
very complex needs or citizens’ demands and to provide tailor-made services (Boris and Steuerle, 
1999). Hence, for governments involving NPOs through different stages of the policy cycle, the key 
challenge becomes one of holding NPOs accountable for the public monies they receive without, 
however, reaping the indisputable benefits that derive from their autonomy of not just being another 
arm of the government apparatus (Huxham, 1995; Boyle and Butler, 2003). The impact of strategic 
management by government on Flemish NPOs will be analyzed in a twofold way: the NPOs’ 
willingness to speak out freely when advocating for particular and sometimes unconventional 
demands on the one hand, and the NPOs’ ability to maintain autonomy in making their own 
strategic organizational decisions on the other.  
Impact on role perceptions of NPOs 
First, it has been shown that government allows NPOs to have a voice, both formally and 
informally, during the process of planning and developing its policies. Moreover, due to their 
unique position close to clients, NPOs are regularly confronted with very particular needs and 
demands from within civil society. This poses a critical challenge to NPOs: will they signal these 
perhaps unconventional issues and defend them even if this puts a pressure on their relationship 
with their main funder, or will they rather chose to ‘conform’ to what they consider as the 
government’s current preferences? This is important as NPOs are expected to provide substantial 
input for informed policy making. After all, there is empirical evidence that maintaining close 
relationships with government has a negative impact on the NPOs’ capacity and willingness to 
perform a radar function and thereby raising a critical voice to advocate for the interests of their 
clients and constituents (Child and Gronbjerg, 2007; Nicholson-Crotty, 2007; Schmid, Bar, et.al., 
2008). Still, a recent study on the advocacy behavior of Flemish NPOs found little evidence to 
support such resource dependence framework (Verschuere and De Corte, 2013). NPO managers 
were hereby asked to indicate the relative share of efforts (time, staff, money, etc.) they were 
spending to perform a so-called ‘expressive’ role (e.g. by participating to formal consultation 
procedures, by maintaining informal contacts with policy makers, by forming coalitions with other 
organizations, etc.) compared to the efforts made for their service delivering role. Based on a large-
N sample of more than 200 NPOs, a one-way Anova analysis showed that although the monies 
received from Flemish government represented more than half of the total budget for many NPOs, 
they did not have a negative (or positive) impact on the NPOs’ willingness to perform a critical role 
towards government as being a watchdog. This implies that Flemish NPOs should not totally fear of 
being ‘punished’ for unwelcome behavior or for speaking out frankly when signaling particular 
needs and demands. This finding was explained by referring to the historically grown ties between 
the nonprofit sector and government in Flanders, which has led to a situation in which both actors 
are, at least partly, dependent upon resources (e.g. financial means vs. expertise or production 
capacity) controlled by the other parties. 
Impact on decision-making autonomy of NPOs 
Secondly, there might be an impact of strategic management practices of Flemish government on 
the NPOs’ capacity to make their own strategic organizational decisions. The involvement with 
governmental funding programs, and the control measures and bureaucratic pressures attached to it, 
can lead to goal displacement and unintentional effects on the choice of programs and clientele 
(Gjems-Onstad, 1990; Gronbjerg, 1991; Smith and Lipsky, 1993; Jung and Moon, 2007; Gazley, 
2010). This might hamper the NPOs’ capacity to tailor services to the particular and often very 
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complex needs of their clients (Salamon, 1995; Boris and Steuerle, 1999). Several studies focused 
on this topic of organizational autonomy and found a negative impact of public resource 
dependence on organizational autonomy. Anheier (1997) found that NPO managers whose 
organizations were financially dependent on government typically adopt state-oriented strategies 
when dealing with crisis situations. Froelich (1999) argued that funding government might exert 
pressure on the NPOs to change some of their internal processes, such as the choice of clientele. 
Gronbjerg (1991) found that public agencies explicitly try to control program choices of the social 
service organizations they fund. Through a longitudinal case study of collaborative partnerships in 
the environmental area, Nicolic and Koontz (2007) showed that government involvement may 
impact organizational resources, issue definition and internal decision-making procedures. A study 
on Korean cultural organizations revealed that NPOs are hampered by public funding, especially in 
goal setting and program choices (Jung and Moon, 2007).  
Our own work (Verschuere and De Corte, 2012) found evidence for supporting  a resource 
dependence framework: the more NPOs relied on funding from Flemish government, the less likely 
they were to report autonomy in making their own organizational decisions, like defining the 
mission, target groups, results to be achieved, and working procedures of NPOs. This implies that 
the strategic management practices of Flemish government do have their drawbacks as NPOs 
become somewhat less flexible in responding to the complex demands they are confronted with in 
daily practices.  
Conclusion and discussion 
In this chapter we present results from a large-N survey in which more than 250 NPO managers 
were questioned about different dimensions of their relationship with governments at different 
levels within the Belgian federal state (also see Table 15.1 and Table 15.2 for an overview). It was 
found that NPOs primarily developed close financial relationships with the regional Flemish 
government. This finding is, however, not that surprising as many legal competencies with respect 
to welfare policies have been transferred over the years to this regional level. Hence, we outlined 
the strategic management practices through which Flemish government tried to involve, steer and 
control private NPOs for the purpose of social service delivery to citizens. Moreover we analyzed 
some potential drawbacks for NPOs of maintaining such close financial and accountability 
relationships with government. As was shown, this was especially the case with regard to the 
autonomy of the NPOs when making their own strategic organizational decisions such as the target 
groups to be served and the results to be obtained when working with these groups. Still, when 
analyzing the extent to which NPOs are able to maintain their flexibility and autonomy as private 
actors, we must also focus attention to the complex institutional environment in which these NPOs 
are functioning. Firstly, we must point to consecutive processes of reforming the federal Belgian 
state since the 1980’s whereby legislative powers concerning social welfare policies have been 
fragmented between the central federal level and the regional level in Belgium. This has led to a 
situation in which NPOs do not only have to be accountable to the regional Flemish government, as 
being their main funder and regulator, but as shown in Table 15.2, some NPOs will have to adhere 
to a set of criteria that are imposed by the federal government as well. Furthermore, as measures 
taken at both governmental levels are not necessarily fully adjusted to one another, this might lead 
some NPOs to operate in a relatively complex institutional environment.  
Secondly, we recently witnessed a tendency to further decentralize competencies and tasks from the 
regional to the local governmental level in Flanders. With the aim of increasing accessibility of 
social service delivery to citizens, the regional government launched the Decree on Local Social 
Policy (2003) in which it asks local governments, as being the governmental level closest to citizens 
and their needs, to enhance cooperation with the NPOs that are active on their territory in at least 
two ways. On an operational level local governments must involve NPOs in the implementation of 
their social policies, while on a strategic level they must give these NPOs a strategic role in 
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developing new policies as well. What is new, however, is that this involvement must not be carried 
out through traditional hierarchical mechanisms of command and control but as a result of 
horizontal relationships via the creation of governance networks. From the perspective of NPOs, it 
could be argued that this will inevitably lead to the development of differing strategic management 
practices at this local level. Once more, an additional pressure is then put on NPOs to develop 
complicated and time-consuming horizontal relationships with local governments in the 
municipalities in which they are active. In practice, however, it appears that the ambitious 
objectives of the Decree are heavily complicated by the context in which Flemish NPOs have to 
operate (Verschuere & De Rynck, 2009). Or in other words, local governments might have little 
financial and regulative levers at their disposal to urge these private actors to cooperate with them. 
As shown before, many NPOs are indeed primarily active at a supra-local scale and are financed 
and held accountable at the higher (Flemish and federal) governmental levels.  
In sum, we might conclude that Flemish NPOs do have to operate within a relatively complicated 
institutional context in Belgium. This is related to the fact that they are confronted with strategic 
management practices at different governmental levels. Furthermore, it was found that nature of the 
relationship they developed at these different governmental levels could vary (e.g. top-down vs. 
horizontal relationships). Finally, it was shown that the strategic management practices, and 
especially those from Flemish government as being their dominant funding source, could have a 









Parameters Descriptive data on Flemish NPOs (N=255) 
Dimension 1 – Giving 
NPOs a voice in the 
planning of social 
policies 
  
Formal channels of 
information exchange 
Participation to the 
different stages of  
formal policy cycle  
Stage Rel % 
 Policy development 66,5% 
Policy Implementation 72,9% 
Policy Evaluation 64,7% 
Informal channels of 
information exchange 
Informal contacts with 
policy makers 
Policy maker Rel % 





Strategy Rel % 











controlling the actors 
that implement social 
policies 
The process of 
holding NPOs 
accountable for the 




Parameters Rel % 
 Service Quantity 74,1% 
Service Quality 71,4% 




Target audience 76,6% 
Social effects 72,6% 
Total Accountability 
Pressure 






Between 2 and 4 
parameters (medium) 
11,4% 




obligation to report to 
Flemish government 
Frequency Rel %  
Never 13,1% 
Once over several 
years 
6,3% 
Once a year 50,4% 
Several times a year 30,2% 
 
Table 15.1 – Strategic management practices in Flanders: the Flemish government (also see 













Parameters Descriptive data on Flemish NPOs (N=255) 
Dimension 1 – 
Giving NPOs a 
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Policy maker Rel % 
 Politicians 34% 62,7% 
Administrations 58,7% 70,7% 
 







The process of 
holding NPOs 
accountable for 




Parameters Rel % 
  Fed Local 
Service Quantity 17% 34% 







Target audience 22% 41% 





















report to Flemish 
government 
Frequency Rel % 




Once a year 28% 35% 
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